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Bhasin v. Hrynew: A New Era for Good Faith
in Canadian Employment Law, or Just
Tinkering at the Margins?
Claire MUMMÉ*
In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker the High Court of Australia refused to
impose an implied duty of mutual trust and confidence into the employment
contract, reasoning that doing so would take the Court beyond its legitimate
authority.1 Issued two months later, the Supreme Court of Canada went in a
different direction. In Bhasin v. Hrynew, the Court crafted a new substantive
doctrine of honest contractual performance, based on a newly-recognized central
organizing principle of good faith in contract law. A few months later the Court
applied the organizing principle of good faith to circumscribe the exercise of an
employer’s discretion in Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission.2
This article offers an assessment of the potential impact of Bhasin and Potter on
the future direction of Canadian employment law.
1 INTRODUCTION
In November 2014, some few months after the Australian High Court’s decision
in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker, the Canadian Supreme Court also
waded into the question of good faith in contract law. In Bhasin v. Hrynew the
Court for the first time recognized that good faith is a general organizing
principle of contract law, and crafted a new duty of honesty in contractual
performance. This new duty, it held, is not an implied term, but rather a
substantive stand-alone contract law doctrine. Amongst Canadian labour lawyers
the decision provoked immediate speculation, as the existence of an employer
duty of good faith has long been the subject of controversy.
Prior to Bhasin, employers held an express obligation of good faith only in
the manner of dismissal. The Canadian courts have generally been reluctant to
place legal obligations on employers other than at the point of dismissal, shying
* Assistant Professor, University of Windsor, Canada, cmumme@uwindsor.ca.
1 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker [2014] HCA 32 (10 Sep. 2014) [Barker].
2 Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 [Bhasin]; Potter v. Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10 [Potter].
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away from expressly regulating the day-to-day operation of the employment
relationship. The Court first used Bhasin in an employment case only a few
months later in Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Commission, a case concerning
constructive dismissal. Surprisingly, the Court did not wait to apply Bhasin to an
employment case involving the narrower stand-alone doctrine of honest
contractual performance. Rather it applied the organizing principle of good faith
to analyze employers’ discretion to administratively suspend with pay.
Because innovation in the field of employment law in Canada has largely
been left to the courts, these two decisions potentially portend important
changes to the common law of employment contract. This article thus offers
some first thoughts on Bhasin and Potter’s implications for the future shape of
Canadian employment law.
2 THE LEGAL CONTEXT
Outside of Quebec, where employment is governed by civil law, a mixture of
common and statutory law regulates non-unionized workers in Canada. The
substantive framework of the relationship is provided by common law principles,
which are then supplemented by statutory obligations provided by minimum
employment standards legislation, human rights codes, occupational health and
safety acts, and others. Only three Canadian jurisdictions have unjust dismissal
legislation.3 In the other provinces, employees may be dismissed at any time
without cause, so long as they are provided with reasonable notice of dismissal,
which is calculated based on a series of judicially crafted factors.4 Although
employment standards statutes are frequently amended, they have not been a
dynamic or progressive force for shaping the regulation of employment in
Canada.5 Other than human rights legislation, the common law has been the
primary site of jurisprudential innovation in Canadian employment law.
In this context the Canadian Supreme Court has been left in charge of
adjudicating broad issues of employment policy at common law. The Court has
struggled with this role. On the one hand, since the late 1980s the Court has
introduced procedural protections concerning dismissal, both with regard to what
3 These are the federal jurisdiction, Quebec, and Nova Scotia.
4 Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 (ON HCJ). The Bardal factors include ‘the
character of the employment, the length of service of the servant, the age of the servant and the
availability of similar employment, having regard to the experience, training and qualifications of the
servant’. The reasonable notice assessment also includes an examination of whether the employee
was induced to leave previous secure employment, and whether there was a promise of job security
in the offer of current employment. See Wallace v. United Grain Growers, [1997] 3 SCR 701 [Wallace].
5 See J. Fudge, Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law’s Little Sister and the
Feminization of Labour, 7 J.L. & Pol’y 73 (1991).
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constitutes cause for dismissal, and to the manner in which dismissal is carried
out.6 The Court has also regularly made grand declarations regarding the
centrality of work to individual dignity and identity.7 It has sought to chart a
middle ground as regards mental distress damages and employer obligations of
good faith. Damages for the general emotive consequences of dismissal are not
available, and a general employer obligation of good faith has not, other than
Bhasin, been imposed. However, employers do hold an obligation to dismiss in a
good faith manner, and damages suffered from bad faith in the manner of
dismissal are compensable so long as particular injury is demonstrable.8
As Kevin Banks argues, over the years the Canadian lower courts have also,
in ad hoc fashion, sometimes imposed limitations on the exercise of employer
discretion during the employment relationship.9 Lower courts have sometimes
read through the lens of reasonableness or good faith contract terms allowing
employers the discretion to grant or withhold economic benefits, or to impose
certain forms of review and discipline.10 In addition, tort law principles have
been used to compensate for defamatory comments made during and after the
employment relationship, and to compensate for intentional infliction of mental
distress.11
As this explanation suggests, a patchwork of lower court decisions have
developed ad hoc mechanisms to control the exercise of employer discretion in
specific situations during the employment contract. But prior to Bhasin and
Potter, these mechanisms were subject to contradictory jurisprudence, and had
not crystallized into a general framework of employer good faith during the
relationship. Indeed, the Supreme Court has assiduously avoided intervening in
the day-to-day operations of the workplace, and has vigilantly protected the
6 McKinley v. BCTel, 2001 SCC 38 [McKinley]; Wallace supra n. 4.
7 Potter, supra n. 2 at para. 83; Wallace, supra n. 4 at paras 90–95; Machtinger v. Hoj, [1992] 1 SCR 986
[Macthinger];Slaight Communications, [1989] 1 SCR 1038 at 1051;Reference re Public Service Employee Rela-
tions Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 SCR 313, Justice Dickson’s dissent at 368.
8 Wallace supra n. 4;Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39 [Keays].
9 K. Banks, Progress and Paradox: The Remarkable Yet Limited Advance of Employer Good Faith Duties in
Canadian Common Law, 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 547 (2010–2011). Banks argues that the
combination of the implied duty of good faith in dismissal, the use of constructive dismissal law to
allow compensation for mistreatment prior to dismissal, and the variety of tort law duties in place
provided relatively generalized protection from mistreatment in employment prior to the decision in
Bhasin v. Hrynew. With this picture in place, he argued in 2011 that it should be only a short step for
appellate courts to recognize a general duty of employer good faith during employment. Banks’
analysis was thus quite prescient, though my own sense is that the case law prior to Bhasin was
perhaps not so generally accepted or extensive as suggested. Many strands of case law existed, but
many were also not generally known and not fully accepted by courts across the country.
10 Ibid., 578–580.
11 Pre-contractual negligent or fraudulent misstatements are also actionable (ibid., 581–582) but as of
2010 negligent infliction of mental distress appeared increasingly unavailable prior to Bhasin. See
sources infra n. 31.
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employers’ ability to dismiss without cause.12 Good faith obligations in
commercial contractual relations have also developed in a piecemeal fashion in
Canada, leaving a collection of duties imposed only in specific types of
relationships and to specific factual circumstances.13
Given the Court’s track record on the question of contractual good faith,
the November 2014 decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew took many in the Canadian
legal community by surprise. Bhasin is a commercial contract case, concerning
the non-renewal of an agency contract. Much like employment law, commercial
contract jurisprudence regarding good faith had stalled since the mid-2000s.Yet
in Bhasin a unanimous Supreme Court held that it was now time to recognize
that good faith is an organizing principle of contract law, and that there is a duty
to honestly perform one’s contractual obligations.
3 BHASINV. HRYNEW:THE FACTS
Bhasin owned and operated an enrolment agency that sold education savings
plans on behalf of Can-Am. Hrynew owned a rival agency, and was the largest of
Can-Am’s dealers in central Canada. Hrynew repeatedly sought to purchase
Bhasin’s agency, but was rebuffed. In 1999 the Alberta Securities Commission
developed concerns regarding Can-Am’s agents’ compliance with provincial
securities regulation, and mandated that the company conduct an audit of its
enrolment agents. Around this time Can-Am decided that it would be in their
best interest if Hrynew took over Bhasin’s company and contracts. It thus
appointed Hrynew as the officer to conduct the securities audit, which gave him
access to the books of all of Can-Am’s agents in Alberta, including Bhasin.
Bhasin refused to allow Hrynew access to his business records, and complained
that Hrynew’s appointment was inappropriate in the circumstance. Can-Am
incorrectly told Bhasin that it was the Securities Commission’s decision to
appoint Hrynew (it was not), and assured him that Hrynew was contractually
bound to confidentiality in his auditor function (he was not). Can-Am failed to
disclose to Bhasin that it wished Hrynew to take over his agency, and that it had
decided not to renew his contract. Can-Am instead used Bhasin’s refusal to give
Hrynew access to his records as a reason not to renew his contract. Bhasin sued
Hrynew for the tort of inducing breach of contract, Can-Am for breach of a
12 Wallace ibid. For an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to good faith over
the twentieth century, see C. Mummé, A Comparative Reflection from Canada – A Good Faith
Perspective Ch. 14a (M. Freedland et al. eds, Oxford University Press: forthcoming 2016).
13 See J. McCamus, The Law of Contracts (2d ed., Irwin Law 2012) at Ch. 21. The courts have
recognized a pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith in limited circumstances. See for
instance Empress Towers Ltd v. Bank of Nova Scotia, [1991] 1 WWR 537 (CA); Mannpar Enterprises v.
Canada (1999), 173 DLR (4th) 243 (CA).
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contractual duty of good faith, and both parties for civil conspiracy. The trial
judge chose to recognize a general duty of good faith in contract, and the issue
made its way up to the Supreme Court.
The Court began by noting that as compared to the United States and
Europe, the Canadian common law is incoherent as regards good faith, imposing
only a patchwork series of ad hoc legal principles. This incoherence not only
places Canada behind other countries, but also contradicts the reasonable
expectations of contracting parties.14 For these reasons, the Court declared, it is
now appropriate to take two incremental steps in the development of the
common law. The first is to recognize that good faith operates as a general
organizing principle of the common law of contracts, a principle that ‘underpins
and informs the various rules that recognize obligations of good faith in
particular situations and relationships’.15 The second step is to articulate a more
concrete duty of honesty in contractual performance.
These two steps are related but distinct. The general organizing principle of
good faith does not ground an independent cause of action, but rather informs
the development of existing (and future) contract law doctrines.The second step,
the duty of honest performance, is an emanation of the general obligation of
good faith. Of particular interest to other common law jurisdictions, the Court
chose not to frame the duty of honest performance as an implied contractual
term. Instead the Court explained that it is an independent contract doctrine, the
breach of which gives rise to damages. Rather than an implied term, the duty of
honest performance is analogous to other equitable doctrines, like
unconscionability, that place limits on freedom of contract.16 The obligation thus
applies regardless of party intention, although the parties may contract to provide
a minimum scope for its content. Finally, the Court specified that the duty of
honest performance does not rise to the level of a fiduciary duty.The duty does
not require subordinating one party’s interest to that of the other and does not
require proactive disclosure of material facts, absent misrepresentation. What the
duty of honest performance does require is for the parties not to lie or
knowingly mislead one another with regard to the performance of their
contractual obligations. Although the Court hastened to add that the duty does
not invite judicial assessment of party intent, it is unclear how that can be
avoided.
14 Bhasin supra n. 2 at para. 32.
15 Ibid., at para. 33.
16 Ibid., at para. 74.
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4 BHASIN’S SIGNIFICANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT LAW
What impact will Bhasin’s two principles have on Canadian employment law? As
mentioned, the Canadian Supreme Court has historically shied away from
regulating the exercise of employers’ managerial prerogative at common law
during the life of the employment relationship. In Canada employers have held
an express duty of good faith only in two circumstances. The first is in the
manner of dismissal.17 Good faith in the manner of dismissal requires employers
to refrain from being untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive, and at
minimum requires them to be candid, reasonable, honest and forthright in the
manner of dismissal.18 Demonstrable emotional injury resulting from a breach of
this duty gives rise to compensation.19 The second is where an employer acts in
a bad faith manner calculated to cause an employee to withdraw from
employment, which gives rise to a claim for constructive dismissal by the
employee.20 An additional employer duty of civility, decency, respect, and dignity
has been developed by the lower courts, but to date it has only been used with
regard to claims for constructive dismissal, rather than as a freestanding obligation
that gives rise to independent assessment loss separate from dismissal.21 At the
same time, however, piecemeal jurisprudence had also developed over the last
decades sometimes using concepts of good faith to regulate the employers’
exercise of discretion. As this description thus suggests, prior to Bhasin the good
faith obligations in Canadian employment law were primarily concerned with
regulating the manner of dismissal, and with ad hoc limitations on the
administration of employer discretion during the life of the relationship. The
question then is whether Bhasin amplifies, or generalizes, employers’ good faith
obligations in new ways.
4.1 THE DUTY OF HONESTY IN CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE
Bhasin articulates two different types of good faith obligations, one a general
interpretive principle, the other a narrower behavioural prohibition. Compared to
the English duty of mutual trust and confidence, the latter duty of honest
performance is thin in formulation. Nonetheless, it is likely to affect a number of
current doctrines and employment practices. One obvious area of its relevance is
to constructive dismissal claims.
17 Wallace supra n. 4;Keays supra n. 8.
18 See Banks, supra n. 9 at 563–569.
19 Keays ibid.
20 Shah v. Xerox Canada Ltd., [2000] 49 CCEL (2d) 166 [Shah].
21 Lloyd v. Imperial Park, [1997] 3 W.W.R. 697 [Imperial Park].
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4.1[a] Independent ActionableWrongs and Punitive Damages
As mentioned, employers are already obliged to treat their employees with
decency, civility and respect, the breach of which gives rise to a constructive
dismissal claim.22 Employer dishonesty, if sufficiently significant, may now also
constitute a repudiatory breach. It may in some cases also entitle the employee to
punitive damages arising from the constructive dismissal. Currently, punitive
damages for employer misconduct in the manner of dismissal are not available in
wrongful dismissal claims, except where mistreatment constitutes an independent
actionable wrong so egregious as to deserve court sanction.23 Severe dishonesty
in contractual performance may thus now offer such an independent actionable
wrong.
4.1[b] Compensation for Losses Arising from Lying or Knowingly Misleading in the
Performance of a Contract Obligation
The more interesting question is whether employer dishonesty or misleading
conduct can now give rise to a claim for breach of contract independent of
dismissal. Employees have sometimes been able to argue that employer promises
formed contractual terms, the breach of which gave rise to compensable loss.24
But employees may now also bring claims for losses arising from lying or
knowingly misleading actions by employers in the performance of an existing
contractual obligation. Cases surrounding pre-contractual negligent and
fraudulent misrepresentations may be useful in giving content to the new duty.
In some instances the courts have held that half-truths that create a misleading
impression constitute misrepresentation.25
Misrepresentation has also been found where a change in circumstance
affects the truth of an earlier statement, but is not disclosed or the impression is
not correct.26 If the duty of honest performance is similarly construed, employers
may find themselves to have run afoul of the duty where they present only a
half-truth to an employee as regards the performance of a contractual term, if
they do not act to correct a statement previously made, or if a change in
circumstance later affects its truth or likelihood.
22 Ibid.
23 Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1085 [Vorvis], as upheld on this point in
Wallace, supra n. 4, and Keays, supra n. 8.
24 See, for instance, Ford v. Laidlaw Carriers Inc., [1993] 50 C.C.E.L. 165.
25 Xerex Exploration v. Petro-Canada, 2005 ABCA 224 [Xerex].
26 With v. O’Flanagan, [1936] Ch 575 (CA); Hogar Estates in Trust v. Shebron Holdings Ltd. (1979), 10
DLR (3d) 509 (ON HCJ).
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While misrepresentation case law concerns inaccurate or misleading
statements of fact, untruthful or misleading promises may now also be binding
even where unsupported by consideration.27 Canadian law does not currently
permit promissory estoppel to be used as a sword.28 Nor does it, in theory at
least, enforce promises to vary a contract without the exchange of fresh
consideration.29 Bhasin now raises the question of whether losses arising from
untruthful or misleading promises will now be compensable. If so, it could
impact on employer promises relating to pay increases, promotions, scheduling
changes, and so on, and thus have a significant impact on interactions between
the parties in the workplace.
An open question is whether the new duty of honest performance will also
allow for claims for non-economic losses arising from dishonesty in the
performance of contractual duties. As mentioned, since the mid-1990s employers
have been subject to an implied duty to treat their employees with civility,
decency, respect, and dignity. David Doorey has argued that this duty could be
used to ground a claim for breach of contract, separate from a wrongful dismissal
claim.30 Writing in the mid-2000s, he advocated for the development of the
duty of civility and respect as a way to allow for compensation for employer
mistreatment during the life of the relationship independent of the losses flowing
from dismissal. Despite his persuasive argument, the duty of civility and respect
has remained bound to constructive dismissal claims, and has never been used to
ground a separate claim for contract breach. Although tort claims for intentional
infliction of mental distress in employment are available, claims for negligent
infliction of mental distress have been increasingly circumscribed of late.31 For
this reason, employer mistreatment during employment that does not rise to the
level of flagrant and outrageous conduct, and/or does not involve the requisite
degree of intention, is not compensable. It may be, however, that violation of the
duty of honest performance will now fill this lacuna, and allow employees to
seek redress for employer mistreatment that imposes a demonstrable loss in terms
of psychological and dignity harm, even if unrelated to dismissal.32
27 This argument was first elaborated by my colleague Jeffrey Berryman in his general reflections on
Bhasin’s potential impact on contract law. J. Berryman, Some Implications of Bhasin v. Hrynew, Good
Gracious! Good Faith in Contract Law, CLE seminar, University of Windsor Faculty of Law, 22 Jan.
2015.
28 Petridis v. Shabinsky (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 215; M(N) v. A(AT) (2003), 12 BCLR (4th) 73 (CA).
29 Gilbert Steel Ltd v. University Construction Ltd (1976), 12 OR (2d) 19 (CA).
30 D. Doorey, Employer ‘Bullying’: Implied Duties of Fair Dealing in Canadian Employment Contracts, 30
Queen’s L. J. 500 (2005).
31 Piresferreira v.Ayotte 2010 ONCA 384; Sanford v. Carleton Road Industries Association 2014 NSSC 187.
32 It may also suggest that the decision in Ayotte, ibid., will be revisited.
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4.1[c] What Constitutes a Contract Term for the Purposes of the Duty of Honest Performance?
The employment relationship provokes a particular issue, which may not arise
with the same frequency with other types of contracts. Bhasin requires honesty in
the performance of a contractual obligation. But employment contracts often
contain few express terms and many terms change over time, evolving as the
relationship progresses. As Freedland argues, they are often treated as ‘exchange
transactions wrapped up in relational contracts’, a hybrid of discrete express
contractual terms of exchange within a relationship that is ongoing and changes
over time.33 Given the incomplete nature of the employment contract, it may
not be a simple matter to determine what constitutes ‘in the performance’ of a
contractual obligation. What would be the effect of lying or misleading in
relation to workplace policies and practices that are not contractually binding?
For instance, would lying to an employee about the reason for changing their
schedule constitute ‘in the performance of a contract term’, if the scheduling
process was not contractually regulated? In other words, will employers’ residual
authority to direct the workplace be sufficiently linked to contract terms to fall
within the scope of the duty, or will it apply only to express contractual
obligations? This then is the large question arising from Bhasin: does it now open
the door to some form of judicial supervision over the day-to-day administration
of the employment relationship? Does it now create a generalized check on the
exercise of employer discretion during the course of the contract?
For employee counsel, one way to address this question is to argue that the
managerial prerogative is a term of the contract. The contractual status of
management rights invokes historical arguments from the 1950s and 1960s
concerning the content of collective bargaining agreements and the scope of
labour arbitrators’ jurisdiction. In those decades active disagreement waged in the
United States and Canada as to whether management held unilateral discretion
over all rights not explicitly ceded in collective bargaining agreements (the
‘reserved rights’ theory), or whether managerial rights stemmed only from
collective bargaining and from the governance process it set in place for the
administration of the workplace (the ‘joint sovereignty’, industrial pluralist
approach).34 Although the reserved rights theory won the day in the labour
33 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract 88–89 (Oxford University Press 2003).
34 J. Phelps, Management’s Reserved Rights: An Industry View, in Management’s Rights and the Arbitration
Process (J. McKelvey ed., B.N.A. Incorporated 1956); H. Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999 (1954–1955); A. Cox, Reflections on Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1482 (1959); L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator Wis. L.R. 3 (1963); P.Weiler, The Role of
the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative versions, 19 U.Toronto L. J. 16 (1969); and D. Feller, A General Theory
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 Cali. L. Rev. 663 (1975); A. Goldsmith, The
Management-Control Collective Bargaining Relationship:Three Models, 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 775 (1986);
P. Girard, B. Laskin: Bringing Law to Life Ch. 10 (University of Toronto Press 2005). For an overview
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context, it may now be an easier argument to make in the non-unionized
employment context. The argument here would be that an employer’s right to
manage the workplace is an implicit term of all employment contracts, the
correlative of an employee’s duty to obey, and thus its performance must be
exercised honestly and without knowingly misleading. In the context of
constructive dismissal law, the Supreme Court has already acknowledged that
employers’ managerial prerogative emerges from the employment contract,
recognizing that ‘an employer can make any changes to an employee’s position
that are allowed by the contract, inter alia as part of the employer’s managerial
authority’.35 The Court explained that unilateral alterations within that zone are
permissible as legitimate exercises of the managerial prerogative because they are
‘not […] changes to the employment contract, but rather applications thereof ’.36
The Supreme Court has thus already cast the managerial prerogative as an
implied contractual term, an argument that could then be deployed to bring
managerial discretion within the scope of the duty of honest contractual
performance.
4.2 THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH: CIRCUMSCRIBING THE
MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE IN POTTER V. NEW BRUNSWICK LEGAL AID
SERVICES COMMISSION
Another approach to regulating employer discretion may be to ground legal
limitations in the second part of the Bhasin decision, the general organizing
principle of good faith.
Joellen Riley recently examined the relationship between the concept of
mutual trust and confidence and that of good faith.37 She argues that the two
duties are related but analytically distinct. Mutual trust recognizes an obligation
not to act in a manner that destroys the trust necessary to the operation of the
relationship. By contrast, good faith is an interpretive principle that ‘assumes that
parties intend to perform their contractual obligations in a manner which
permits each party to enjoy the mutually intended benefits of the contract’.38
Applying Riley’s typography to Bhasin, we might say that the Canadian ‘general
of this debate in the US and Canada, see E. Shilton, Industrial Pluralism, Reserve Rights and Weber
presented at the Queen’s University Centre for Law in the Contemporary Workplace conference
‘One Law for All’: Has Weber v. Ontario Hydro Transformed Collective Agreement Administration and
Arbitration in Canada? In Honour of the Late Bernie Adel, October 2015, publication forthcoming.
35 Farber v. Royal Trust Co (1997) 1 SCR 846 at para. 25 [Farber].
36 Ibid.
37 J. Riley, Siblings but Not Twins: Making Sense of ‘Mutual Trust’ and ‘Good Faith’ in Employment Contracts,
36 Melb. L. Rev. 521 (2012).
38 Ibid., 536.
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organizing principle of good faith’ is akin to good faith as interpretive principle.
The Canadian duty of honest performance is narrower than the English duty of
mutual trust and fair dealing, and may therefore be considered as a sort of subset
of that duty. Given the limited scope of the duty of honest performance, it may
be that the organizing principle of good faith will be of greater significance to
the development of employment law. In addition to directing the interpretation
of contract terms, the organizing principle of good faith may also be used to
guide the exercise of employers’ discretion. Indeed, this is the course the
Supreme Court appears to have adopted in the recent Potter decision.
A few months after Bhasin, the Court drew on the new organizing principle
of good faith in considering constructive dismissal and administrative suspensions
with pay.39 In Potter the Court explained that there are two types of constructive
dismissal scenarios: the first is a unilateral alteration to an essential term of the
contract, and the second is a series of acts which together evince the employer’s
intent to no longer be bound by the contract, even in the absence of a particular
contract breach. For cases falling into the first scenario, a two-step test is used.
The first step is to identify which express or implied term was breached, and the
second step is to determine whether a reasonable person in the employee’s
position would understand the employer to have made an alteration to an
essential term of the contract.
In the context of administrative suspensions, the first step requires
identifying whether the employer held an express or implied authority to
administratively suspend, and thus whether an alteration has occurred.40 The
Court went on to hold, relying on its 2004 decision in Cabiakman concerning
Quebec civil law, that an employer cannot hold an implied right to suspend
unless the suspension is justified, and it cannot be justified unless it was imposed
in good faith and in furtherance of a legitimate business reason.41 Applying the
test to the facts before it, the Court concluded that acting in good faith required
the employer to communicate the reasons for the suspension to the employee. In
doing so the Court cited Bhasin and the organizing principle of good faith,
noting that ‘acting in good faith in relation to contractual dealings means being
honest, reasonable, candid, and forthright’, and that failing to give an employee
reasons for suspension is not being forthright.42 Because the suspension was not
undertaken in good faith, it did not fall within the employer’s residual authority
to administratively suspend, and because there was no such express contractual
39 Potter supra n. 2.
40 Potter, ibid., at paras 59–68.
41 Cabiakman v. Industrial Alliance Life Insurance Co 2004 SCC 55.
42 Ibid., at para. 99.
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right to suspend, the Court held that Potter was constructively dismissed and
entitled to damages.
The Court moreover took the opportunity to revisit the question of where
employers are obligated to provide work.The Court held that the ‘employer may
not withhold work in bad faith or without justification’. Withholding work is
not an unfettered employer right, because to so permit would ‘undermine the
non-monetary benefit all workers may in fact derive from the performance of
their work’. Drawing once again on principles of good faith, the Court went on
to explain that an unfettered right to withhold work ‘would also be inconsistent
with the employer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing that has been gaining
acceptance at common law’.43
In Potter the Supreme Court used existing case law as well as the new
organizing principle of good faith to regulate the manner in which an employer
exercised its discretion, beyond any particular term of the contract. The duty of
honest contractual performance was not argued here. Rather, the Court was
willing to take a good faith lens to determining the scope of an employer’s
residual discretion to suspend. As noted, different strands of case law already
imposed good faith requirements on the exercise of employer discretion in
particular circumstances, including as regards administrative suspension. Thus
arguably Potter simply represents the application of existing principles elaborated
in Cabiakman. However, one can also see Potter as indicating the Court’s growing
willingness to adopt and generalize those existing ad hoc principles, and as
suggesting an increasing desire to frame and circumscribe employer discretion
through a good faith lens.
5 CONCLUSION
Whether the new organizing principle of good faith, and new duty of honest
performance, are broad enough to impose generalized good faith requirements
on employer action remains to be seen. The duty of honest performance will
undoubtedly affect existing doctrines, some of which I have touched on here,
and may open up new ones for use. But framed as a relatively narrow negative
prohibition, it imposes only a minimum behavioural standard on employers’
43 Potter, supra n.2 at para.68.The analysis suggests,but does not expressly state, that the Court considers the
right to administratively suspend and the right to withhold work as effectively the same.The Court holds
that neither right is unfettered, and can only be exercised in a good faith manner in pursuance of a legiti-
mate business interest.The Court also holds that the right to administratively suspend must emerge from
an express or implied contractual right. The relationship between these two holdings is somewhat
opaque. It is not clear whether there is a residual right to suspend/withhold, but one that must be exer-
cised in good faith, or whether there is no right to withhold/suspend unless there is contractual author-
ity to do so, which must then be exercised in good faith.
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actions. It is the general organizing principle of good faith, I would suggest, that
provides the greatest opportunity for suffusing employer action with good faith
obligations. If it is robustly deployed as an aspirational and interpretive tool, as
Potter would suggest, it may serve to give content and guidance to the parties’
ongoing obligations towards one another, to provide shape to the fluid and
changing nature of employment contracts.
Over the last twenty years the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly
recognized the structural inequality of the employment relationship. It has
repeatedly held that employment is one of the most important relationships in
our lives, central both to our economic survival and to our sense of self. But
while employees have for centuries held a duty of good faith towards their
employers, the Court has consistently refused to require a similar obligation by
employers to their employees. This refusal belied the Court’s commitment to
protecting employee vulnerability by maintaining an asymmetry of rights
between the parties, and further entrenching the power differential between
them. Whether Bhasin and Potter portend substantive advances or symbolic
change, the Court now seems poised to at least recognize that good faith is not a
one-way street. In Canadian employment law, that alone may be significant.
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